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Environmental and pro-social norms: evidence on littering
Abstract
The paper investigates the relationship between pro-social norms and its implications for improved
environmental outcomes. This is an area, which has been neglected in the environmental economics
literature. We provide empirical evidence to demonstrate a robust link between perceived environmental
cooperation (reduced public littering) and increased voluntary environmental morale. For this purpose
we use European Values Survey (EVS) data for 30 European countries. We also demonstrate that
Western European countries are more sensitive to perceived environmental cooperation than the public
in Eastern Europe. Interestingly, the results also demonstrate that environmental morale is strongly
correlated with several socio-economic and environmental variables. Several robustness tests are
conducted to check the validity of the results.
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Abstract:  The paper investigates the relationship between pro-social norms and its 
implications for improved environmental outcomes.  This is an area, 
which has been neglected in the environmental economics literature. We 
provide empirical evidence to demonstrate a robust link between 
perceived environmental cooperation (reduced public littering) and 
increased voluntary environmental morale. For this purpose we use 
European Values Survey (EVS) data for 30 European countries. We also 
demonstrate that Western European countries are more sensitive to 
perceived environmental cooperation than the public in Eastern Europe. 
Interestingly, the results also demonstrate that environmental morale is 
strongly correlated with several socio-economic and environmental 
variables.  Several robustness tests are conducted to check the validity of 
the results.   
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1 Introduction 
 
In recent times, a growing number of studies have been devoted to examining 
individual environmental preferences and attitudes. Initial interest in 
environmental attitudes dates back to the early 1970s (Bord and O’Connor, 1997). 
An increasing number of economists have been involved in evaluating whether an 
individual’s environmental morale and environmental motivation could help to 
reduce environmental degradation or the problems of free riding associated with 
public goods (cf. Frey and Stutzer, 2007). It is also possible to adopt alternative 
solutions. One possible alternative solution is to ‘force’ people to cooperate via 
punishment. This is in line with deterrence policy based on the economics-of-
crime approach. Theory would indicate that an individual would maximize utility 
by taking into account the probability of detection and the degree of punishment. 
Expected utility is maximized, taking into account the probability of detection and 
the degree of punishment. However, empirical and experimental findings indicate 
show that deterrence models predict too little compliance. Moreover, the level of 
compliance observed cannot be explained by the amount of risk aversion 
involved. People are more compliant than these models predict. For example,. 
The level of compliance observed cannot be explained by the amount of risk 
aversion involved . The literature suggests that social norms help us to explain 
such high degree of compliance (Torgler, 2007).  As Meier (2007) has pointed out 
Individuals also behave in many situations not in line with self-interest, but rather 
pro-socially (Meier 2007). Several laboratory experiments have shown that 
behavior in public good games is driven by conditional cooperation. In other 
words subjects cooperate when others cooperate and defect when other defect (for 
an overview, see Gächter 2007).  
This paper investigates whether conditional cooperation can be found in 
individuals’ attitudes to the environment.  It is important to focus on 
environmental issues since environmental behavior is often used as a key 
application in public good games. Therefore, based on the arguments of 
conditional cooperation we hypothesise that individuals may be willing to 
contribute conditionally to the environment, depending on the pro-social behavior 
of others. To empirically test this hypothesis we use European Values Survey data 
where we examine individual’s value judgments about how acceptable littering is 
and relate it to individual’s perception of other individuals’ environmental morale. 
The main result and contribution of the paper is that individual’s own 
environmental morale is closely correlated with the perceived morale of others 
around, as predicted by the literature on conditional cooperation.  
To our knowledge, our paper provides findings not yet discussed in 
previous environmental research. There is no study that investigates whether 
conditional cooperation is relevant in the environmental economics literature. It 
Owner ! 3/12/08 06:10
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remains uncertain whether previous results in laboratory or field experiments are 
directly transferable in a context that deals with environmental aspects. The paper 
therefore complements previous laboratory and field experiments by providing 
empirical evidence outside of a lab setting using the wide-ranging European 
Values  Survey which covers 30 Western and Eastern European countries.  
The paper is set out as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of the 
existing literature on social comparisons while Section 3 presents the theoretical 
approach and develop our hypotheses. Section 4 presents the empirical results. In 
Section 5, we discuss the potential causality problems and Section 6 concludes 
with a summary and discussion of the main results.  
 
 
2 Overview of the literature  
 
Many traditional models have treated public cooperation as an isolated 
case. However, subjects do not normally act as isolated individuals playing a 
game against nature. This paper emphasizes the relevance of social context in 
understanding the willingness of individuals to keep the environment clean. The 
behavior of other citizens is important to understand why people comply. Hence, 
theories of pro-social behavior, which take into account the impact of behavior or 
the preferences of others are promising. The concept of pro-social behavior is 
widely practiced in daily life. For example, Vesterlund (2003) reports that 
charitable organizations have an incentive to ask donors who make large 
contributions to permit the use of their name when a donation is made. Such an 
announcement is likely to have a positive effect on others who have not yet made 
a contribution. It also helps to reduce the problem of free-riding and encourages 
individuals to make larger contributions.  
Several theories have been put forward to explain what constitutes 
conditional cooperation. Most papers in the literature (cf. Rabin, 1998 and Falk 
and Fehr, 2002) explain conditional cooperation in terms of reciprocity. In an 
environmental context, reciprocity means, for example, that if many individuals 
don’t throw litter in a public place, other individuals would feel obliged to do 
likewise. As mentioned in the introduction, several laboratory experimental 
studies (e.g public good experiments) provide evidence for the existence of pro-
social behavior. For example, Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr (2001) find that 50 
percent of the subjects were conditionally cooperative. Falk, Fischbacher and 
Gächter (2003) create a laboratory situation in which each subject is a member of 
two economically identical groups, where only the group members are different. 
The study observes that the same subjects contribute different amounts, 
depending on the behavior of others in the group. The study finds that 
contributions are larger when group cooperation is higher. 
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Alternative to reciprocity, the concept of conformity (cf. Henrich, 2004) 
has been used to explain conditional cooperation. Conformity refers to the 
motivation of individuals to fulfill social norms (e.g. keeping the environment 
clean) and, therefore, acting according to society’s rules. This concept is less 
connected to incentives and benefits than is reciprocity. In this case, individuals 
would contribute, even if the good in question does not benefit anyone, as long as 
it is perceived that a sufficient number of individuals are contributing (Bardsley 
and Sausgruber, 2005).   
While several early studies provide evidence of conditional cooperation 
within a laboratory setting, an increasing number of studies have been conducted 
to check the validity of such studies outside of a laboratory setting. Frey and 
Meier (2004a) provide field experimental evidence of conditional cooperation. 
They analyze students’ decisions regarding contributions to two social funds 
administered by the University of Zurich. Their study shows that, when more 
individuals expect others to cooperate, they are more willing to cooperate. In 
another study, Frey and Meier (2004b) observe that the strongest reaction to 
information about other individuals behavior is observed in students who are 
uncertain whether or not to contribute to two Public Funds at their University. 
Heldt (2005) conducts a natural field experiment on conditional cooperation, in 
which cross-country skiers in two Swedish ski resorts are faced with the decision 
of whether or not to contribute to ski track funding. The results suggest that the 
percentage of subjects making a contribution is higher when they know that a 
higher percentage of individuals are making a contribution. Shang and Croson 
(2005) conducted a field experiment at an anonymous public radio station during 
an on-air fundraising campaign to investigate the influence of social information 
on the size of an individual’s contribution. The results indicate that social 
information does indeed influence contributions. Martin and Randal (2005) has 
conducted a natural field experiment at an art gallery where admission was free, 
but a donation could be placed in a transparent box in the foyer. The results 
showed that visitors donate significantly more when there is already some money 
in the box. 
 The study of pro-social behavior resulting from perceived public 
cooperation is an area that has largely been ignored in the environmental 
economics and management literature, despite its potential to influence 
environmental outcomes. The connection between perceived environmental 
cooperation of other individuals and environmental morale has not been studied in 
the environmental economics and management literature. In contrast, studies 
linking improved environmental behavior, or higher willingness to pay for 
environmental preservation with education, knowledge, environmental awareness 
and prior experience are well established in the environmental economics 
literature (cf. Tisdell and Wilson, 2001). Lack of studies on environmental 
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conditional cooperation may be explained by the unavailability of quality survey 
data, although the concept itself may not be new to researchers in environmental 
economics and management. The European Value Survey provides quality survey 
data covering the relevant questions to enable this study to be undertaken. 
Pro-social behavior occurs voluntarily. Such behavior is not only linked 
with public goods but also with particular private goods. The crucial feature here 
is that an individual acts according to the way the majority of the public is acting, 
and not necessarily because he or she benefits directly from such action. Hence, 
any strategies to increase pro-social behavior have the potential to improve 
environmental and social outcomes in a cost effective manner.  
In everyday life, there are many environmental outcomes that can be 
improved through enhanced pro-social actions. In the paper we demonstrate the 
relationship between an individual’s perceptions of the public not throwing away 
litter in public places and an increase in the individual’s willingness to protect the 
environment. Other areas where such behavior is useful are, for example, 
conserving energy and water, contributing to environmental conservation, 
reducing pollution, engaging in wildlife friendly gardening, becoming members 
of environmental organizations and volunteering.  In fact, the number of 
environmental activities that can benefit from pro-social behavior is endless. 
This study looks at the disposal of litter to examine whether individual 
behavior is influenced by their perception of how other people behave. Despite 
litter in public places being recognized as a major public health and safety hazard 
and diminishing the aesthetic appearance of public places (cf. Ackerman, 1997), 
few studies have focused on dealing with this issue. Litter and unkempt lawns 
have also been linked with crime (cf. Brown et al., 2004). Existing studies 
examine the role that education can play in reducing public litter (cf. Taylor et al., 
2007), and the instruments (e.g. taxes, fines, charges and market incentives) that 
can be used to minimize the problem of public littering (cf. Fullerton and 
Wolverton, 2000; Ackerman, 1997; Dobbs, 1991). One study (Kinnaman and 
Fullerton, 1994), dealing with garbage recycling, examines why some households 
participate in curbside recycling programs, even in the absence of a user fee; why 
other households do not participate, even in the presence of a user fee; and why 
some households choose to litter while others do not. However, the Kinnaman and 
Fullerton (1994) paper deals with user fees and does not address the issue of 
conditional cooperation in littering behavior. 
 
3 Empirical approach  
 
3.1 Data set 
Exploring the social norms as dependent variable is not irrelevant. 
Prevailing social norms tend to generate increased individual cooperation in 
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public good situations and, in some instances, of private goods as well. Violation 
of social norms has negative consequences, such as internal sanctions (e.g. guilt, 
remorse) or external legal and social sanctions, such as gossip and ostracism. As 
Polinsky and Shavell (2000) point out, the corresponding literature focuses on the 
influence that social norms have on individual behavior, and their role as a 
substitute for, or a supplement to, formal laws. Laws themselves can influence 
social norms. Rege and Telle (2001) suggest that social norms may explain why 
many individuals don’t litter public places. If littering is not acceptable in a 
society, a “person throwing his ice-cream-paper on the street will feel social 
disapproval from people observing him… many people do not litter even if they 
know that nobody is observing them, because littering imposes a feeling of guilt” 
(p. 3). Feelings of guilt or shame restrict behavior. 
In contrast to experimental studies conducted on conditional cooperation, 
this paper uses EVS data. This is a European-wide survey that is conducted to 
investigate social, economic, cultural and political changes. The survey also 
collects data on the basic values and beliefs of people throughout Europe. The 
EVS was first conducted from 1981 to 1983, in the second survey from 1990 to 
1991 and the third survey in 1999 through 2001, with an increasing number of 
countries participating over time. The methodological approach is explained in 
detail in the EVS (1999) source book, which provides information on response 
rates, the stages of sampling procedures, the translation of the questionnaire, and 
field work, along with measures of coding reliability, reliability of data, and data 
checks. All country surveys are conducted by experienced professional survey 
organizations, with the exception of Greece.  Interviews are face-to-face and those 
interviewed are adult citizens aged 18 years and older. Tilburg University 
coordinates the project and provides the guidelines to guarantee the use of 
standardized information in the surveys and maintain the national 
representativeness of the data. To avoid framing biases, the questions are asked in 
a prescribed order. The response rates vary from country to country.  However, 
the average response rate is around 60 percent.  
Because EVS asks an identical set of questions in various European 
countries, the survey provides a unique opportunity to examine the impact of 
conditional cooperation on environmental morale and preferences. This paper 
considers 30 representative national samples of at least 1,000 individuals in each 
country. The survey permits us to work with a representative set of individuals, 
covering a large set of countries. The data allows us to complement previous 
laboratory and field experiments with survey studies to demonstrate the existence 
of conditional cooperation in relation to environmental issues. 
  
3.2 Dependent variable and conditional cooperation 
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From the EVS survey data we have selected individuals’ willingness to keep 
public places free from litter ass the dependent variable. The question in the 
survey was framed as follows:  
   
Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it is 
always justified, never justified, or somewhere in between: … Throwing 
away litter in a public place.  
 
A ten-scale index is used for this question, with the two extreme scales being 
‘never justified’ and ‘always justified’. This variable is identified as (a particular 
case of) environmental morale. The natural cut-off point is the value 1, where a 
high amount of respondents assert that throwing away litter in a public place is 
‘never justified’ (68.3 percent). Previous studies on other justifiability variables 
using World Values Survey data find support of a similar cutoff point and apply a 
probit model in their empirical model (cf. Swamy et al., 2003). In line with this 
approach, our environmental morale (EM) variable takes the value 1 if the 
respondent says that throwing away litter in a public place is ‘never justified’, and 
zero otherwise. In addition, we compare the original scale with an ordered probit 
model and an OLS with standardized/beta coefficients to test the relative strength 
of a variable. We will also use an ordered probit after re-coding the ten-scale 
variable into a four-point scale (0, 1, 2, 3), with the value 1 assigned for “never 
justified”. The scale numbering from 4-10 are assigned the value 0 due to lack of 
variance. Such an approach is standard practice and has been used, for example, 
in the happiness and tax compliance literature (cf. Frey and Stutzer 2002; Torgler 
2007). In general, it is important to go beyond the original probit model (1=never 
justified) since the answer to the question could be biased due to experimenter 
demand. It is obvious that the “socially correct” answer would be “never 
justified”. Such a concern arises if a large number of individuals who think that it 
is justified to throw away litter in public places state littering is never justified. In 
other words, if the respondents want to give the “socially acceptable” answer they 
would say “1” and if not they would answer truthfully. In this latter case, an 
answer of “0” might be indicative of a much higher environmental morale than an 
answer of “1”. In this case we would have a problem that respondents want to 
avoid looking bad in front of the interviewer (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2001). It 
would also indicate that we would observe systematic biases rather than just 
random errors. Hence, we will use several methods to deal with this problem. In 
the first instance, we try different cutoff points. We report, for example, a probit 
model where we convert the values 1 and 2 to 1 (all the other values = 0)1. In 
addition, we also run a two-stage regression approach where the original 0/1 
                                                
1 The results remain robust when testing alternative cutoffs.  
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model is treated as just the first stage. In the first stage, respondents decide 
whether or not to answer 1 (“socially correct response”) on line (case 1) and other 
compliance aspects case 1 (e.g., tax evasion, bribing, joyriding). In the second 
stage, given the decision to answer something other than the socially correct 
response, individuals report a value from 2 to 10. In this case, the second stage 
regression would be used to explore the impact of conditional cooperation.2 In 
addition, one can also examine the existence of cognitive problems (Bertrand and 
Mullainathan 2001). The experimental literature has shown that manipulations 
(e.g., order of the question, wording or scales) can affect how people process and 
interpret questions. The problem arises because “respondents may make little 
mental effort in answering the question, such as by not attempting to recall all the 
relevant information or by not reading through the whole list of alternative 
responses” (Bertrand and Mullainathan, p. 68). To check this point we explore the 
correlation between two similar questions asked in the EVS in different parts of 
the interview:  
 
How interested would you say you are in politics? (IP) Very interested (value 1), 
somewhat interested (2), not very interested (3), not at all interested).  
 
How important is politics in your life? (INP) Very (1), (rather 2), not very (3), not 
at all (4).  
 
The correlation at the individual level is 0.614. Moreover, we also explore the 
correlation with the question:  
 
When you get together with your friends, would you say you discuss political 
matters frequently (value 3), occasionally (value 2) or never (value 1)? (DP).  
 
The correlation between INP and DP is 0.451 and between IP and DP is 0.564. 
Thus, all the variables are highly correlated. Face-to-face interviews may also 
help to guarantee that subjects are aware of the whole list of alternative responses. 
The EVS has also the advantage of being a wide-ranging survey covering a large 
amount of different topics.  The data for the environmental question used in this 
paper was only a part of the large EV survey. Hence, this further reduces the 
environmental framing biases.  
The approaches discussed are relevant because empirical support for a 
theoretical foundation depends not only on the validity of the theory but also on 
the quality of the data. It is not possible to ascertain whether respondents are 
                                                
2 It should be noted that in all reported models the original variable was recoded in such a manner 
where a higher value represents a lower justifiability of littering. 
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truthful in their answers with survey data since truth is not observable by the 
interviewers (Kanazawa 2005). To validate statements one could explore the 
correlation between respondents’ statements and the observable behavior. 
However, this is only possible for specific questions (e.g., voting behavior). Using 
an attitudinal question, such as in our case, reduces the possibilities of conducting 
such a validation analysis. Nevertheless, we could explore the correlation between 
EM and environmental performance/outcome at the macro (country) level. We, 
therefore, explore the relationship between our dependent variable and the 
Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI) developed by the Yale Center for 
Environmental Law and Policy and the Center for International Earth Science 
Information Network at Columbia University. The index measures the ability of 
nations to protect the environment over the next few decades integrating 76 data 
sets tracking natural resource endowments, past and present pollution levels, 
environmental management efforts and the capacity of a society to improve its 
environmental performance covering 21 indicators of environmental sustainability 
(see ESI 2005). Although the conditional cooperative question (PL) has not been 
covered in World Values Survey (WVS), the EM question has been asked in 
WVS survey. We, therefore, use the WVS3 to explore the correlation between 
justifiability of littering and ESI. The results are reported in Figure 1. We take the 
country mean values of all the waves to generate our justifiability of littering 
variable. In this case we don’t recode the variable. In other words, higher values 
are correlated with a higher level of justifiability of littering. In the ESI index, 
higher values are correlated with a higher level of environmental sustainability. 
The index ranges from 0 to 100. The highest values can be found in Scandinavian 
countries such as Finland, Norway or Sweden (a score of more than 70). Figure 1 
shows an expected negative correlation, showing a strong relationship (Pearson 
r=-0.373) that is statistically significant at 0.01 level. Analyzing the linear 
relationship in a simple regression indicates that the ‘justifiability of littering’ 
variable can explain approximately 15 percent of the total variance of the 
dependent variable (ESI).  Such results indicate the usefulness of working with 
attitudinal questions despite the potential survey biases.  
Next we use the following question as an independent variable to 
investigate the impact of conditional cooperation (PL = perceived littering) on 
EM. 
 
 “According to you, how many of your compatriots do the following: 
Throwing away litter in a public place?” (4=almost all, 1=almost none) 
 
                                                
3 We used country average values over the available waves.  
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In general, we observe an increased interest among economists, especially 
behavioral and environmental economists, to use survey data. For example, 
research that deals with social capital, corruption, happiness and tax compliance 
explore the causes of attitudes using other attitudinal variables as independent 
factors (cf. Diener and Suh, 2000; Brewer and Steenbergen, 2002; Uslaner, 2004; 
Brewer et al., 2004; and Chang and Chu, 2006 and Torgler, 2007). In this paper, 
we investigate the correlation between perceived compliance and environmental 
morale in a multivariate analysis controlling for other factors in order to better 
isolate the relationship. A specification based on multivariate analysis has the 
obvious advantage of presenting a more balanced view of the role of conditional 
cooperation by separating the effects of other exogenous variables. However, if 
conditional cooperation differs systematically in some other way that also affects 
the willingness to cooperate, the results could be misleading.  
 
 
4 Econometric results 
 
Our multivariate analysis includes a vector of control variables.  Previous research 
in environmental economics and social norms demonstrates the importance of 
considering socio-demographic and socio-economic variables along with 
variables such as the level of church attendance, formal and informal education 
and participation in an environmental organization (cf. Torgler and Garcia-
Valiñas, 2007; Torgler, 2007).  In addition, we use a further variable to identify a 
potential conditional cooperation behavior effect, namely individuals’ concern for 
society4. The question measures how individuals experience their surrounding 
environment. We differentiate between two different regions of Europe (i.e. 
Western and Eastern Europe) to see whether there are any discernable differences 
between the two regions.  The rapid collapse of institutional structures in Eastern 
European countries during the 1990s produced a vacuum in many, if not all, of 
these countries. This led to large social costs, especially in terms of worsening 
income inequalities, increasing poverty and poor institutional conditions resulting 
from uncertainty and high transaction costs. Torgler (2003) and Alm et al. (2006) 
show that such circumstances have had an impact on social norms.  In addition, 
we are also using country fixed effects in several questions to control for country 
specific conditions.  
                                                
4 To what extend do you feel concerned about the living conditions of: your immediate family, 
people neighbourhood, people own region, fellow countrymen, Europeans, human kind, eldery 
people, unemployed people, immigrants, sick and disabled (5=very much, 1=not at all). 
Index=sum of all the 10 questions). 
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Table 1 presents the first results of the multivariate analysis. In these 
initial estimates, we exclude income. This is because the ten-point income scale in 
the EVS is based on national currencies, which reduces the possibility of 
comparing nations in a cross-country comparison.5 The self-classification of the 
respondents’ economic situation into various economic classes may be used as a 
proxy. However, data for this purpose has not been collected in all countries. 
Thus, we include economic status sequentially in the specification. This is shown 
in Table 3. 
 In Table 1, we use several models to check the robustness of results.. In 
EQ1 we use a weighted probit model with the cutoff point 1 (1=littering is never 
justified, 0=else). To deal with the “socially desirability” problem we change the 
cutoff point in EQ2. The values 1 and 2 in the original scale have been coded as 1 
and all other values as 0. The process and justification were discussed in the 
previous section. In EQ3 we report a weighted ordered probit using the 10 point 
scale recoding the scale in such a manner that it represents environmental morale 
(EM, 10=littering is never justified). In EQ4 we report the four-point weighted 
ordered probit model and in EQ5 an OLS with beta or standardized regression 
coefficients are presented to indicate the relative importance of conditional 
cooperation compared to the other variables used. To measure quantitative effects 
in the (ordered) probit case, we calculate the marginal effects. Marginal effects 
indicate the change in the probability of individuals having a specific level of 
environmental morale when the independent variable increases by one unit. For 
simplicity, the marginal effects in all the estimations are presented for the highest 
value only. Weighted estimates are conducted to make the samples correspond to 
the national distribution.6 Furthermore, answers such as ‘don’t know’ and missing 
values are eliminated in all estimations. This is standard procedure for work of 
this nature. 
Consistent with our main hypothesis, the estimation results in Table 1 
indicate that the lower the perceived environmental cooperation of other persons 
(higher values of the variable), then the lower is the environmental morale. In all 
the regressions, the coefficient for perceived environmental cooperation (PL) is 
statistically significant. The marginal effects indicate that if the perceived lack of 
cooperation rises by one unit, the percentage of persons reporting the highest 
environmental morale falls by more than 2 percentage points. EQ5 indicates the 
relative importance of PL. Larger beta values are observed only for some of the 
age variables.  
Looking at the other variables, we observe that being active in an 
environmental organization has a positive effect, with marginal effects being 
                                                
5 Moreover, income is coded on a scale from 1 to 10 and these income intervals are not fully 
comparable across countries.  
6 The weighting variable is provided by the EVS.  
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around four (4) percentage points. Moreover, concern for others is also positively 
correlated with environmental morale (EM). A positive correlation can also be 
found for church attendance7. In all cases, the coefficient is positively correlated 
with our dependent variable. This supports the argument that churches can act as 
social norm enforcers (cf. Torgler, 2006). We also observe a very strong age 
effect. This is consistent with the compliance and criminology literature (Hirschi 
and Gottfredson, 2000; Torgler, 2007), but not with several studies on 
environmental attitudes that report that age is negatively correlated with the 
willingness to contribute to additional environmental protection, since older 
people are unlikely to enjoy the long-term benefits of preserving resources 
(Whitehead, 1991; Carlsson and Johansson-Stenman, 2000). Table 1 also reports 
gender differences, reporting a higher environmental morale among women. 
Zelezny et al. (2000) report that regardless of age, women show more concern for 
the environment than men. In our analysis, we observe strong gender differences. 
On the other hand the results do show a robust relationship between information 
or formal education8 and EM. 9 With reference to educational issues, the literature 
shows that formal education has a significant positive influence on environmental 
willingness to contribute (Blomquist and Whitehead, 1998; Engel and Pötschke, 
1998; Witzke and Urfei, 2001; Veisten et al., 2004). On the other hand, informal 
education is also important (Whitehead, 1991; Blomquist and Whitehead, 1998; 
Carlsson and Johansson-Stenman, 2000; Hidano et al., 2005). The literature 
argues that well-informed citizens are more aware of environmental issues and 
problems and have stronger environmental attitudes, because they are more 
knowledgeable about the possible damage (Danielson et al., 1995; Torgler and 
Garcia-Valiñas, 2007). However, one should note that the literature on 
compliance does show a clear relationship in regards to education (Torgler 2007). 
Finally, marital status might influence environmental attitudes as well. It can be 
argued that married people are more compliant or more concerned about 
environmental degradation than others, especially compared to singles. They are 
more constrained by their social network and are often strongly involved with the 
community (Tittle, 1980). This argument also holds true when focusing on moral 
                                                
7 Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, how often do you attend religious services these 
days? More than once a week, once a week, once a month, only on special holy days, once a year, 
less often, practically never or never (8= more than once a week to 1=practically never or never). 
 
8 Formal education is usually expressed as the level of education or degrees a person has obtained. 
It can alternatively be expressed as the number of years spent in education (Blomquist and 
Whitehead, 1998).  
9 Formal education: At what age did you complete or will you complete your full time education, 
either at school or at an institution of higher education? Please exclude apprenticeships. Informal 
education/political discussion:  When you get together with friends, would you say you discuss 
political matters frequently, occasionally or never (3=frequently, 2=occasionally, 1=never)?  
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attitudes or, in our case, environmental morale. Overall, the estimates indicate a 
tendency for married individuals to have relatively high environmental 
preferences and high levels of environmental morale, although the differences are 
not always statistically significant.  
In Figures 2 and 3 and Table 2 we explore whether the conditional 
cooperation effect holds for both regions namely Western and Eastern Europe. 
First, we explore the conditional cooperation effect at the country level.  For this 
purpose we build average values for each country using the 10 point scale 
(10=never justified) available for the environmental morale variable. Figure 1 
shows a relatively strong negative correlation (Pearson r=-0.460), significant at 
the 0.05 level. The simple linear regression shows that the PL variable can explain 
more than 20 percent of the total variance of the EM variable in Western Europe. 
On the other hand the correlation between PL and EM is not statistically 
significant for Eastern Europe. It is interesting to note that a study in Australia has 
found that littering is more commonplace in regional and rural areas (see 
Beverage Industry Environment Council, 2001). One reason for this could be that 
in areas with low incomes littering is taken for granted and that most individuals 
do not find littering to be a problem. Hence, such an attitude has very little or no 
impact on morale. A similar result is observable at the individual level (see Table 
2). We used the probit model reported in EQ2 that deals with the “social 
desirability” issue. EQ6 and 7 in Table 2 focus on Western Europe and EQ8 and 9 
on Eastern Europe. Here, too, we observe a similar picture. The coefficient PL is 
statistically significant in Western Europe, but not in Eastern Europe. The 
marginal effects for PL in Western Europe are comparable to age and the 
environmental organization variable. The OLS estimates even report the largest 
beta coefficients for PL for Western Europe. Interestingly, we also observe other 
regional differences in Table 2. Religiosity (in our case church attendance) only 
matters for Western Europe. This shows that environmental social norm 
enforcement through churches is not observable in Eastern Europe. One reason 
might be that that communist countries tried to eradicate organized religion in 
most East European countries for a over long period of time, regarding it as 
“competitive with the Communist quasi-religion” (Barro and McCleary, 2002, p. 
13). Moreover, participation in an environmental organization matters only for 
Western Europe. This could partly be explained by the lack of environmental 
organizations in most East European countries, especially during the communist 
regime. On the other hand formal education is positively correlated with EM for 
Eastern Europe, but not for Western Europe. This result could be that for 
individuals in Western countries other forms of education and informal 
information matter more than formal education for the development of an EM. 
In Table 3 we conduct several robustness tests using the same two models. 
Rather than using a dummy variable to differentiate between Western and Eastern 
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Europe, we consider country fixed effects in all the four reported regressions. In 
EQ12 and EQ13 we also add the income proxies. Several studies show that the 
economic situation of an individual is an important aspect (Whitehead, 1991; 
Stevens et al., 1994; Blomquist and Whitehead, 1998; Popp, 2001; Witzke and 
Urfei, 2001; Bulte et al., 2005; Dupont, 2004; Veisten et al., 2004; Hidano et al., 
2005). These studies show a positive relationship between income and a 
preference to contribute to environmental causes. Our study on the other hand 
points to a non-linear relationship reporting the highest environmental morale for 
the middle class, but without being statistically significant in EQ13. The PL 
variable on the other hand is statistically significant in all 4 cases. Compared to 
the previous tables we observe that the marginal effects decrease, but the beta 
coefficients in EQ11 and EQ13 show that the relative importance of PL has not 
changed.  
In Table 4 we conduct further robustness tests to deal with a potential 
“social desirability” bias. We run a two-stage approach regression (see EQ14 to 
17) where the previous estimations were just the first stage. First, respondents 
decide whether or not to answer that littering is never justified (“socially correct 
response”). In a second stage, given the decision to answer something other than 
the socially correct response, individuals report a value from 2 to 10 (EQ 14 and 
15). Furthermore, we use an alternative restriction by focusing on several 
justifiability variables on compliance, namely: cheating on tax if you have the 
chance, claiming state benefits for which you are not entitled to, taking and 
driving away a car belonging to someone else (joyriding), lying in your own 
interest, and someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties (see EQ16 
and 17). If people were to provide the “socially desirable” answer we would 
predict a similar answer with regards to other variables that measure social norms. 
The data indicates that in 26% of the cases individuals report that all these actions 
are never justified. In Table 4 we report the findings with regional (EQ14 and 16) 
and country fixed effects (EQ16 and 17). Looking at Table 4 we can also see that 
PL matters.  
 
 
5 Causality 
 
Causality remains an issue, because one’s own attitudes may lead to the 
expectation that others behave in the same way10. However, results from ‘strategy 
                                                
10 The EVS has the disadvantage that it is not a panel survey. A survey that follows individuals 
over time would help us to study the dynamics of adjustment more deeply. The question referring 
to conditional cooperation was only asked in the last EVS of 1999 through 2001. Longitudinal 
data would help us to reduce problems caused by unobserved individual heterogeneity.  
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method’ experiments conducted by Fischbacher et al. (2001) and Fischbacher and 
Gächter (2006) suggest that causality goes from beliefs about others’ cheating to 
one’s own behavior rather than vice versa. Nevertheless, we will 1) conduct 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests for endogeneity in IV estimation, 2) run several 2SLS 
estimations with three different instruments, and 3) try to filter out a PL bias by 
correcting for the possibility that individuals project their beliefs on how others 
behave or act. 
 Table 5 reports the results of three two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
estimations together with their first stage regressions. The instruments used are 
individuals’ interest in friends11 (EQ 18), an index of perceived honesty12 (EQ 19) 
and trusting others13 (EQ 20). We are going to add the second two instruments 
sequentially into the specification. A stronger preference and awareness for 
interactions outside one’s own behavior may trigger conditional cooperation. As a 
proxy we use the variable interest in friends. We observe a low correlation 
between this instrument and the residual (r=0.04), which indicates that such a 
variable affects PL but not EM. Moreover, an overall perceived impression of the 
compliance in regards to more serious legal offenses (e.g., tax evasion), should 
also affect how people perceive the way others behave in other areas such as 
littering (e.g., areas where legal rule deviances are less enforced and punished). 
We, therefore, build an index of perceived honesty. We observe a high correlation 
with PL (r=0.5) and a low correlation with the equation’s disturbance process 
(r=0.03), which supports the requirements of a good instrument. Moreover, 
having a higher trust in others or of society may enhance comparisons and 
individuals’ interest to take the perceptions of others’ behavior into account. 
Interestingly, we observe practically no correlation with the residual (r=0.0074). 
Moreover, in Table 5 we provide several tests that explore the relevance of our 
instruments. The results show that the instruments and the F-tests for the 
instrument exclusion set in the first-stage regression are statistically significant. 
Moreover, we also conduct the Anderson’s likelihood-ratio test. A failure to reject 
the null hypothesis would call the identification status of the estimated equation 
into question (Baum 2006). Table 5 shows that we can reject the null hypothesis 
that our specified instruments are redundant. We also conduct a Durbin-WU-
Hausman test for endogeneity in the three IV estimations. The null hypothesis in 
Table 5 which indicates that OLS is an appropriate estimation technique cannot, 
                                                
11 Please say how important each of the following is in your life… friends and acquaintances 
(4=very important, 1=not at all).  
12  Index covering the sum of the following questions: According to you (on a scale from 1 to 4), 
how many of your compatriots: (1) Pay cash for services to avoid taxes?(2) Go over the speed 
limit in built-up areas?  
13 Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too 
careful in your dealings with people? (1=most people can be trusted, 0=can’t be too careful.) 
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in most of the cases, be rejected.  In other words, the C tests statistic shows the 
tendency that we cannot reject exogeneity of our PL variable. Now looking at our 
2SLS results we observe that PL is statistically significant in all three estimations. 
This supports previous results.  
Table 6 uses yet another approach to deal with a potential endogeneity 
problem. It filters out a possible bias in the conditional cooperative effort. A 
causality problem may arise because an individual’s willingness to cooperate (low 
justifiability of littering) could lead to the expectation that others would also 
behave in the same way. Thus, individuals with a higher EM have a lower 
perception of others not cooperating or contributing (lower PL). To deal with this 
possibility, we first calculate the average EM for each country. In the second 
stage we calculate the average PL cooperation in each country for individuals 
having the highest EM14 value. Next, we build the difference between the two 
average values. These values may measure a particular bias in PL due to the level 
of environmental morale (e.g., high EM). The obtained variable (bias) is then 
added to the individual values of the group with the highest EM. As a 
consequence, the PL values between the group with higher and lower EM are 
brought closer to together, depending on the PL level in each country. Table 5 
presents the results for the filtered PL variable using regional (EQ 21) and country 
(EQ 22) fixed effects. Furthermore, we also observe that the previous results 
remain robust.  
 
6 Conclusions  
 
The paper investigated whether perceived environmental cooperation of the 
public is an important determinant of explaining an individual’s environmental 
morale. Our attention was focussed on littering. Our hypothesis was that an 
individual’s behavior is likely to be influenced by their perception of the behavior 
of other individuals. For example, if an individual believes that throwing litter in a 
public place is common, then the environmental morale of the individual 
decreases. Alternatively, if an individual believes others to be compliant, then the 
environmental morale increases. Using recent EVS data for Western and Eastern 
European countries, we provided empirical support for the hypothesis. The results 
remain robust using a large amount of specifications and conducting several 
robustness tests. We also addressed issues relating to potential causality and data 
limitation issues. By investigating the public’s littering, the paper underlines the 
importance of using a rich set of theories to fully understand what influences 
                                                
14 Value 1, stressing that throwing away litter in a public place is never justifiable. 
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individuals’ willingness to contribute towards improving outcomes. Individuals, 
indeed, do not act in isolation.  
To our knowledge, this is the first study of this nature demonstrating the 
relationship between perceived environmental cooperation of others and an 
individual’s environmental morale. We selected littering in public places for our 
study. The evidence provided has many policy implications. For example, the 
existence of this relationship can be used to bring about positive environmental 
outcomes in other areas. The interesting and attractive feature of this behavior is 
its voluntary nature. Such behavior is not only cost effective but can be more 
effective in areas where law enforcement and market incentives fail.  
The results of this study should be useful for decision-makers as well. The 
challenge is that it is not clear whether an inclination to conditionally cooperate is 
good or bad for the environment. Conditional cooperation suggests that there are 
two (long run) equilibria. Zero cooperation arises if a large number of people are 
littering or in other words non-cooperative. On the other hand, full cooperation 
will come forth if a large number of people are not littering.. The results showed 
that individuals in Western countries had high environmental morale while it was 
low in the case of Eastern European countries. Thus, a critical mass of 
cooperative individuals is required to induce a positive dynamic process of 
conditional cooperation that assures that the cooperative equilibrium is reached. 
On the other hand, a society which has many non-compliant individuals will 
inherit a weak social norm. In the case of littering it will lead to what we call a 
“littering trap”. Thus, policies should take into account the creation of a path-
dependent process within a society. The closer we are to the threshold or tipping 
point, the easier it is to influence the dynamic conditional cooperative process. 
However, identifying such a point is not without problems. However, one 
possibility is to improve the institutional conditions (see, Friedman et al. 2002). 
The compliance literature has shown that the equilibrium position with respect to 
a system reflects the balance of political forces and institutions. Institutional 
improvements can provide shocks to a new equilibrium (Bird et al. 2006) or in 
our case the chance to move above the threshold point to induce positive 
conditional cooperative dynamics.  
Understanding what shapes environmental morale needs to be investigated 
further. Only a limited number of studies have explored the relevance of social 
interactions. A good understanding of the interactions between environmental 
morale and perceived environmental cooperation, and the factors strengthening 
these relationships, has the potential to bring about better environmental 
outcomes.  
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Figure 1: Correlation Between Environmental Sustainability and Justifiability of Littering  
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Figure 2: Correlation between Perceived Environmental Cooperation and Environmental 
Morale in Western Europe 
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Figure 3: Correlation between Perceived Environmental Cooperation and Environmental 
Morale in Eastern Europe 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
